on the common law, as where the common law enables the third party to establish a right which arises independently of the contract, for example one based on tort where the party can formulate its claim in tort nothing in the 1999 Act will affect it, although as will be seen, regard may be had to the terms of the contract in determining whether a tortuous duty has arisen and the scope of such duty.
In India, it has been held that where a contract is made for the benefit of a third person there may be an equity in favour of the third person to sue upon the contract, 3 and it has been suggested that a person It has also been held that if the courts consider that it would be aid of justice to adjudicate between the parties, the courts may allow a third party to a contract to sue for doing justice between the suitors; and a suit by the addressee of an insured article sent by post was entitled to sue if the article was not delivered. 12 A legal representative of a company staying in a hotel under a contract between the company and the hotel were entitled to sue for compensation on account of his death, though he was not a party to the contract. 13
BURDEN ON THIRD PARTY
A similar problem arises in relation to the burden of an exemption clause. It is a principle of law that a person who is not a party to a contract cannot be subjected to the burden of that contract. So at Common law an exemption clause will, as a general rule only operate so as to take away the rights of the contracting parties, and not those third parties who suffer injury or damage. In Haseldine v. C.a. Daw & Son.
Ltd. 1993. The owners of a block of flats employed the defendant.
Engineers to repair a lift in the building. Owing to their negligence the lift was badly repaired and H, the visitor to the premises, was injured when the lift fell to the bottom of the lift shaft. The defendant was held liable in tort for negligence. Goddard LJ said. It is however argued that it is not right that a repairer who as in the present case, has stipulated with the Kasturamma v. Chelikani Venkasurayya Garu (1915 ) 29 Mad. LJ 538, AIR 1916 (document crated a trust); Ganesh Das v. Bantoo (1935) 16 Lah. 118, 158 IC 387, AIR 1935 Lah. 354. 12 Post master General Patna v. Ram Kirpal Sahu AIR 1955 person who employs him that he shall not be liable for accidents, should none the less be made liable to a third person. The answer to this argument is that the duty to the third party does not arise of the contract, but independently of it.
It has been noted that this reasoning is of special importance where a person bails goals to another in order that may be carried or worked on by the bailee. In turn, the bailee may sub-contract the task of carrying the goods or working on them to a sub bailee. If the contracts between the bailee and sub bailee contains exemption clauses which exonerate the subbailee from liability, the bailor will not automatically be bound. The subbailee, who cannot be protected against the bailor, who is not a party to the contract, unless the bailer expressly or impliedly consented to the bailee making a sub-bailment containing those conditions. The 1999 Act does not affect the principle that a third party to a contract can't be subjected to the burden of an exemption clause in that contract. But by section 1(4), a third party who wishes to enforce a term conferring a benefit on him or her can only do so subject to and in accordance with any other terms of the contract. Those other terms may impose burdens and conditions on the enjoyment of any benefit.
COMMON LAW TECHNIQUES FOR AVOIDING THE

PRIVITY OF CONTRACT IN RELATION TO EXEMPTION
CLAUSES
Perhaps the most significant point is that some of Lordships seemed to accept a principle of vicarious immunity, according to which a servant or agent who performs a contract is entitled to immunity from liability which his employer or principle would have had. Hence, although the ship owners may not have been privity to the contract of carriage (between shipper and charter) they took possession of the goods on behalf of, and as agents for the charters and so could claim the same protection as their principals. At one time the proposition was advanced that where a contract contained an exemption clause, any employee or agent while performing the contract was entitled to the same immunity from liability as the employer or principal. But this principle of 'vicarious immunity' was rejected by the House of Lords in Scruttons Ltd. vs. Midland Silicons, (1960) 2 All ER.
There are however, a number ways in which the doctrine of privity may be avoided at common law. The willingness of the courts to do so have varied.
The application of the doctrine in some cases can be seen as a part of the process by which courts sought to alleviate the position of those affected by onerous terms, for instance, clause seeking to exclude liability for personal injury resulting from negligence, now prohibited by statute the reluctance to save negligent people from the normal consequence of their fault, however extended beyond such cases and may have influenced the decision in Scruttons vs. Midland Silicones Ltd.(1960) 2 All ER, since that decision, the perceived need to support established commercial practice and to avoid redistributing the risks of transactions has led to greater judicial dissatisfaction with the operation of privity in such situations and a greater willingness to avoid the operation of the doctrine.
There are two methods of avoiding the privity doctrine at common law; (i) contractual route and (ii) tortuous route. The contractual route involves the identification of a second contract between the claimant B and the person wishing to rely on the exemption clause. The second route is based on the exemption clause showing that the claimant B, in its contract with A, assumed the risk of damage or loss resulting from the negligence of the defendant so as to qualify or negate the defendant's tortuous duty of care to it or, more narrowly, the duty created by virtue of the defendant being a bailee or sub-bailee of goods. In its wider form this was not favoured by the majority in Scruttons Ltd, v. Midland Silicones Ltd.(1960) 2 All ER, but has since attracted some support. 14 Before examining these, the position where the contracting party intervenes to protect the defendant has been discussed as follows
PROMISE NOT TO SUE
Where the contract containing the exemption clause can be construed as a promise by the claimant not to sue the third party defendant, if the contracting party intervenes in the proceedings to protect the defendant, the Court may stay or dismiss the claimant's claim. The Courts may be able to imply that a party (A) to a contract containing an exemption clause which is intended to benefit third parties such as its employees or sub-contractors was either acting as agent for the third parties or as agent for the other party to the contract (B) so as to direct contractual relationship between B and the employees or subcontractors. This device was first employed during the nineteenth century, when England was (as it is again) covered by a network of small railway companies and a contract made with one might entitle the holder of a ticket to travel on one or more of them. In such circumstances, the passenger was not allowed to say that only the company which was a party to the primary agreement was protected by the exemption clauses contained in it. The Courts were ready to find either that the contracting company was acting as agent for the other companies. or that it was acting as agent for the passenger. Firstly the bill of lading makes it clear that the stevedore is intended to be protected by the provisions in it which limit liability Secondly the bill of lading makes it clear that the carrier, in addition to contracting for these provisions on his own behalf, is also contracting as agent for the stevedore that these provisions should apply to the stevedore Thirdly the carrier has authority to do that, or perhaps later ratification by the stevedore would suffice, and Fourthly that any difficulties about consideration moving from the stevedore were overcome.
CONTRACT BY PERFORMING SPECIFIED ACT
Lord Reid's speech encouraged the use of "Himalaya" clauses, 15 which extend the defences of the carrier to servants, agents and independent contractors engaged in the loading and unloading process. In The exclusion clause in question was expressed to be entered into by the carrier as agent for its servants, agents and independent contactors, and therefore "the exemption is designed to cover the whole carriage from loading to discharge, by whomsoever it is performed: the performance attracts the exemption or immunity in favour of whoever the performer turns out to be". 18 Further, In the opinion of their Lordships, to give the appellant the benefit of the exemptions and limitations contained in the bill of lading is to give effect to the clear intentions of a commercial document, and can be given within existing principles. They see no reason to strain the law or the facts in order to defeat these intentions. It should not be overlooked that the effect of denying validity to the clause would be to encourage actions against servants, agents and independent contractors in order to get round exemptions. 19 17 (1975 ) AC 154, 167-8. 18 (1975 ) AC 154, 167. 19 (1975 AC 169, Lord Wilberforce emphasised the difficulty of analysing many of the common transactions of dally life within the classical "slots" of offer, acceptance and consideration; (1975) AC 154,,,, 167. In dissenting speeches, Viscount Delhorne and Lord Simon of Glaisdale emphasised that artificial reasoning should not be employed in contractual interpretation with the effect of rewriting contractual provisions. Viscount Dilhorne stated that ...clause 1 of the bill of lading was obviously not drafted by a layman but a highly qualified lawyer. It is a commercial document but the fact it is of that description does not mean that to give it efficacy, one is at liberty to disregard its language and read into it that which it does not say and could have said or to construe the English words it contains as having a meaning which is not expressed and whichis not implied." (1975) AC 154, 170, At p. 172, he referred with approval to the judgment Nevertheless, the reasoning of Lord Wilberforce in The Eurymedon has been criticised as artificial, 20 primarily because it effectively rewrites the Himalaya clause, which was an agreement between the shipper and the carrier and from which it is difficult to detect an offer of a unilateral contract made by the shipper to the stevedore. 21 The Eurymedon was not received with enthusiasm in other jurisdictions. 22 21 Since the carrier desires the result that holders of the bill of lading should not sue his servants or independent contractors, he can achieve this by procuring that they promise not to sue, by contracting to indemnify the servants or agents against claims, and by making it clear to the consignor and holder of the bill that he has done so. The carrier would then be able to obtain the staying of any action against the third party in breach of this agreement. See F Reynolds (1974) 90 LQR 301, 304. side, it was still at P's risk P made good the damage and sued the defendant for the loss, which amounted to more than 1900.
Devlin J. held that P was bound by the exemption clause. Although it was not a party to the contract of carriage, it was entitled to the benefits of the contract and had in consequence also to accept its liabilities. In the Midland Silicones case, (1960) 2 All ER 737(CA), however, it was stated that this decision could be supported 'only upon the facts of the case, which may well have justified the implication of a contract between the parties.' 27 It may therefore be an example of an implied contract, that is to say, all three parties intended P to participate in the contract of affreightment.
When the third party is brought into a direct contractual relationship with one of the parties to the contract by reason of the device of agency or of an implied contract, the exemption clause relied on will be controlled by contract between them is one which is not subject to the control of the legislation. It has been noted that the position is different where the third party proceeds under the 1999 Act.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK, NEGATION OF DUTY
Turning to the non-contractual route the majority in Scruttons Ltd.
vs. Midland (1962) 2 All ER 737(CA), rejected Lord Denning's powerful reasoning based on general defence to actions in tort where a claimant has voluntarily consented to take risk of a loss or injury. But in the case of bailment a similar principle may project an employee or sub-contractor.
Where a bailor bails goods to a bailee who in turn sub-bails them to third party who damages them. The Third Party may be able to rely on the terms on which the goods were sub bailment containing the exemption clauses. Where this is so the bailor is bound by an exemption clause in a contract to which it is not a party, a defendant who is sued in tort may also rely on an exemption clause in a contract to which the claimant but not the defendant is a party as rest restricting excluding the duty of care that it would otherwise owe to the claimant.
Where this is so the defendant is taking the benefit of an exemption clause in a contract to which it is not a party, a defendant who is sued in tort may also rely on an exemption clauses, so in a Pacific Associates Inc. Official Referee, doubted that unilateral contract reasoning could be applied beyond the specialised practice of carriers and stevedores and described it as "uncomfortably artificial". In particular The Eurymedon was held inapplicable because it could not be said that the head-contractors were agents for the subcontractors. Nevertheless, effect was given to the exclusion clause in an alternative way by finding that it negatives the duty 28 (1985) 30 where a building was damaged by fire as a result of the negligence of the sub-contractor. The main contract provided that the building owner was to bear the risk of damage by fire, and the sub-contractor contracted on the same terms and conditions as in the main contract. The owner sued the sub-contractor in tort. The Court of Appeal held that, although there was no direct contractual relationship between the owner and the subcontractor, nevertheless they had both contracted with the main contractor on the basis that the owner had assumed the risk of damage by fire. Hence, the subcontractor owed the owner no duty of care in respect of the damage which occurred.
May LJ said I do not think that the mere fact that is no strict privity between the employer and the subcontractor should prevent the latter from relying upon the clear basis upon which all the parties contracted in relation to damage to the employer's building caused by fire, of the contractors or subcontractors. 31 The reasoning in both cases represents a controversial application of 29 The judge applied the speech of Lord Wilberforce in Anns v. Merton London Borough Council (1978) AC 728, 751-752 to determine whether a duty of care in tort arose between the client and the subcontractors. He found that sufficient proximity existed to render it reasonably foreseeable by the subcontractors that a failure by them to exercise care would lead to loss or damage to the client. He then asked whether there were any considerations which suggested that the scope of that duty should be reduced, and said that the contractual exemption clause, which defined the area of risk which the client was entitled to regard the contractors as undertaking responsibility for, meant that no duty of care arose. Although this precise approach to the establishment of duties of care in negligence is now out of favour, the courts will presumably employ similar reasoning to determine whether it is "just and reasonable" to impose a duty of care: see Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman (1990) 2 AC 605; Murphy v. Brentwood DC (1991) 1 AC 398. Finally, while the Eurymedon principle, or something like it, was commercially necessary, the principle rested on technicalities that would continue to throw up difficulties unless and until it was recognised that, in this area, there should be a fully-fledged exception to the third party rule Lord Goff said the following. There can be no doubt of the commercial need of some such principle as this, and not only in cases concerned with stevedores; and the bold step taken by the Privy Council in The Eurymedon, and later developed in The New York Star, has been widely welcomed. But it is legitimate to wonder whether that development is yet complete. Here their Lordships have in mind not only Lord Wilberforce's discouragement of fine distinctions, but also the fact that the law is now approaching the position where, provided that the bill of lading contract clearly provides that (for example) independent contractors such as stevedores are to have the benefit of exceptions and limitations contained in that contract, they will be able to enjoy the protection of those terms as against the cargo owners.
The problem of consideration in these cases is regarded as having been solved on the basis that a bilateral agreement between the stevedores and the cargo owners, entered into through the agency o the ship-owners may, though itself unsupported by consideration, be rendered enforceable by consideration subsequently furnished by the stevedores in the form of performance of their duties as stevedores for the ship-owners; the problem of authority from the stevedores to the ship-owners to contract on their behalf can, in the majority of cases, be solved by recourse to the principle of ratification; and consignees of the cargo may be held to be bound on the principle in Brandt v. Liverpool Brazil and River Plate Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. 36 Though these solutions are now perceived to be generally effective for their purpose, their technical nature is all too 34 (1992) 97 DLR (4th) 261, 369. 35 (1996) 3 WLR 1.
apparent; and the time may well come when, in an appropriate case, it will fall to be considered whether the courts should take what may legitimately be perceived to be the final, and perhaps inevitable, step in this development, and recognise in these cases a fully-fledged exception to the doctrine of privity of contract, thus escaping from all the technicalities with which courts are now faced in English law. It is not far from their Lordships' minds that, if the English courts were minded to take that step, given consideration to the question whether they should face up to this question in the present appeal. However, they have come to the conclusion that it would not be appropriate for them to do so, first, because they have not heard argument specifically directed towards this fundamental question, and second because, as will become clear in due course, they are satisfied that the appeal must in any event be dismissed. Since, however, a fully fledged common law exception such as the Canadian one would not be subject to the limitations in the 1999 Act, for exemption that the third party be identified by name, class, or description, the courts may consider it inappropriate to enlarge the statutory provisions by judicial innovation.
CONCLUSION
